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Vertical De-Integration in the Mutual Fund Industry: 







This paper extends the knowledge-based view of the firm by using relative 
measures of two fundamental classifications of knowledge as factors of production. It 
relates differences in relative quantities of these classifications of knowledge to the 
probability that a given stage of production is outsourced or de-integrated. The probability 
of de-integration of adjacent stages of production is found to increase on increasing reliance 
on tacit knowledge and decreasing reliance on encapsulated knowledge. The research was 
motivated by the belief that the cost and value of knowledge, as a factor of production, 
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INTRODUCTION 
We often find diversity when examining whether adjacent stages of production are 
separated by inter-firm boundaries in any given industry in developed economies. An 
examination of the Canadian mutual fund industry, for example, finds that about four-fifths 
of all mutual funds use in-house portfolio managers, but about one-fifth use the portfolio 
management services of sub-advisors external to the mutual fund management firm - a 
level of de-integration similar to that found in the mutual fund industries of other developed 
economies. This paper provides evidence using a knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV) 
that suggests that differences in the types of knowledge used in production may explain the 
contemporaneous existence of integrated and de-integrated organizational structures in an 
industry. 
This study responds to the challenge of optimizing firm boundary location by 
“applying an economic calculus to knowledge” (Simon, 1999, p. 34). If differences in cost 
and technical efficiency of knowledge-based factors of production are a function of 
specialization over time, as suggested by Demsetz (1988), then in efficient markets, one 
would expect these different costs and technical efficiencies to be manifested as differences 
in proportions of knowledge-based factors used in various stages of production. These 
differences in relative reliance on distinct knowledge-based factors of production may also 
be expected to affect the location of inter-firm boundaries. Put another way, this paper 
addresses a fundamental KBV question. 
Do differences in knowledge-based factors of production explain the presence or 
absence of inter-firm boundaries? 
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Jensen and Meckling (1996) stress that to optimize decision-making, it is important 
that decision authority and relevant knowledge be co-located. They further suggest that the 
distribution of decision-making rights in the economy reflects the limitations of 
individuals’ knowledge (Jensen, Meckling, 1996). In other words, organizational structures 
in a competitive environment are constructed to economize on the deployment of pertinent 
knowledge among various actors. Since the mutual fund industry is competitive, it is 
reasonable to assume that organizational structures found in the industry exist because they 
represent the economic distribution of knowledge (but this remains to be tested). The notion 
that firm boundaries are found to economize on knowledge-based factors of production sets 
the context for this paper. 
The question of firm boundary location is important since it attempts to establish 
which productive activities a firm should undertake in-house, which products it should 
purchase or activities it should outsource, and when it should sell its product to the next 
segment of the value chain (Demsetz, 1988). Firms continually decide whether to abandon 
a process currently performed in-house to upstream or downstream firms and whether to 
extend into upstream or downstream activities. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Much of the evidence relating vertical integration to profitability is based on 
concepts grouped under the general heading of transaction cost economics (TCE), a 
concept introduced by Coase (1937) and later elaborated by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981) 
and others. Evidence based on TCE theory suggests that vertical integration may lead to 
enhanced firm performance by reducing switching costs (Monteverde, Teece, 1982), 
enhancing monitoring of sales forces (Anderson, 1985), protecting relationship-specific 
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investments (Joskow, 1987), and reducing small numbers bargaining and intellectual 
property rights expropriation hazards (Pisano, 1990). 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that de-integrating for production purposes 
may enhance firm performance. This evidence counters a possible over-emphasis on 
transaction cost avoidance as motivation for vertical integration. Threats of technological 
uncertainty and obsolescence in industries with many participants, argue against integration 
(Balakrishnan, Wernerfelt, 1986). Research also suggests that firms more capable at 
measuring innovation performance will prefer alliances over integration (Robertson, 
Gatignon, 1998), and those with strong technological capabilities may de-integrate even in 
the face of ex-post contract renegotiation hazards (Mayer, Salomon, 2006). While TCE is 
said to subsume economizing on production costs (Williamson, 1979), empirical research 
has generally focused on economizing on transaction costs and assumed the absence of 
differential production costs (Langlois, Foss, 1999) (for exceptions, see Hoetker, 2006; 
Mayer, Salomon, 2006; Walker, Weber, 1984). 
Production 
One perspective that has lacked significant attention has been the examination of 
vertical integration or de-integration in terms of economic efficiency of combining different 
quantities of distinct knowledge-based factors of production. Assuming differences in 
comparative advantages between firms in the application and generation of economically 
valuable knowledge, it would seem logical to locate firm boundaries so as to take 
advantage of these differences. 
“Because it is uneconomical to educate persons in one industry in the detailed 
knowledge used in another, recourse is had to developing or encapsulating this knowledge 
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into products or services that can be transferred between firms cheaply because the 
instructions needed to use them do not require in-depth knowledge about how they are 
produced… A production process reaches the stage of yielding a saleable product when 
downstream users can work with, or consume, the ‘product’ without themselves being 
knowledgeable about its production” (Demsetz, 1988, p. 159). 
“A single firm works a product into new, simpler-to-use… products until the 
diversity of uses further downstream is so great as to require this firm… to bear greater 
costs of information acquisition and maintenance that are avoided by potential users… Title 
to ‘the’ product is likely to change hands when this point in the development of product… 
is reached… The boundary defining degree of vertical integration will have been 
established (Demsetz, 1988, p. 160)”. 
Specialization 
Firms, as well as individuals, specialize in the knowledge they apply in production. 
Continuous specialization intensifies comparative advantages, which in turn, promotes even 
more specialization in the generation of various “shapes” of knowledge (Simon, 1999). 
Differences between classifications of knowledge are therefore elemental to a 
comprehensive knowledge-based view of the firm. 
Demsetz (1988, 1991) considers firms to be knowledge storage units and suggests 
that firms can enhance their potential by specializing in the acquisition of knowledge. It is 
economical for firms to specialize because it is expensive to generate, preserve, and exploit 
knowledge (Demsetz, 1988). Knowledge specialization by firms manifests itself in a 
constructive cycle of human-capital reinforcement, further specialization of labour, and 
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improvement in economically efficient production (Becker, Murphy, 1992; Demsetz, 1988, 
1991; Grant, 2002). 
Grant (2002) also argues that specialization of knowledge defines the firm. First, the 
knowledge applied within a firm for production is more specialized than the knowledge 
required in utilizing the firm’s products. Secondly, firms provide the organizational 
environment within which the specialized knowledge of individuals can be integrated 
(Grant, 2002). 
Vertical Integration and De-integration 
Along a given value chain, firms may benefit from specialization by focusing on the 
stage(s) of production in which they have a comparative advantage, and exiting from those 
stages in which they have a comparative disadvantage. When a market interface (inter-firm 
boundary) exits between two stages of production, firms will generally select their position 
either upstream or downstream of the boundary so as to maximize their productive 
efficiencies (Demsetz, 1988; Jacobides, Hitt, 2005; Pfaffmann, 1998, 2000). 
A market interface in a value chain does not obviate the need from some knowledge 
overlap as the firms on either side of the inter-firm boundary will be engaged in some 
complementary tasks simply by virtue of their adjacency in the value chain (Pfaffmann, 
2000). However, these firms will derive their comparative advantage from productive 
activities based on dissimilar tasks rooted in their specialized knowledge. 
Integrating adjacent stages of production that differ significantly in their specialized 
knowledge could lead to managerial diseconomies of scope (Jacobides, Hitt, 2005; 
Lawrence, Lorsch, 1967). Productivity in each of the adjacent stages could be constrained 
if, for example, common management practices (Prahalad, Bettis, 1986), or a single 
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technological paradigm and trajectory (Dosi, 1982), were applied to both stages. De-
integrating the adjacent stages in those cases, and applying a more focused management on 
each stage, could enhance overall productivity (Jacobides, Hitt, 2005). 
A knowledge-based productivity explanation may dominate traditional transaction 
cost economic (TCE) theory in explaining inter-firm boundaries. In research conducted by 
Argyres (1996), evidence suggested that firms outsource, or de-integrate from, those stages 
of production in which they have a comparative disadvantage in capabilities. He found an 
inter-firm boundary between a tacit-knowledge-based mold-making stage and a more 
formalized-knowledge-based design engineering stage (Argyres, 1996). While de-
integration of the two adjacent stages of production may be explained from a knowledge-
based productivity perspective, it runs contrary to the TCE theory that suggests integration 
of the two stages based on the high physical asset specificity of customized molds 
(Argyres, 1996). 
This paper provides further evidence that differences in relative reliance on 
fundamentally different knowledge-based factors of production may be instructive in the 
location of inter-firm boundaries. The unit of analysis in this study is the boundary between 
mutual fund management firms and the portfolio managers who manage individual mutual 
funds. A given mutual fund is considered integrated if its portfolio manager(s) are 
employees of the mutual fund management firm or an affiliated firm, and is considered de-
integrated if a firm independent of the mutual fund management firm employs the portfolio 
manager. 
Analytical intensity of complex security valuation 
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Definition of a mutual fund. The Securities Act of Ontario is the legislation that 
governs the bulk of the mutual fund industry in Canada since the industry is centered in 
Toronto, Ontario, and securities legislation currently falls under provincial jurisdiction. 
This act defines a mutual fund, with some exceptions, as an issuer whose primary purpose 
is to invest money provided by its security holders, and whose securities entitle the holder 
to receive on demand a proportionate interest in the value of the fund’s net assets. In the 
same act, an issuer is defined as “a person or company who has outstanding, issues or 
proposes to issue, a security” (Securities Act, 2007). 
A mutual fund is an “open-ended” investment fund, which means that investors can 
contribute money to the fund at any time as well as redeem their units or shares to the fund 
at any time. When units or shares of a mutual fund are redeemed the investor receives an 
amount of money based on the current market value of the fund s portfolio. Fund managers 
charge fees, based on the value of the fund’s assets, for administering the fund and 
compensating the various service providers in the value chain. These service providers 
include portfolio managers who are contracted by mutual fund management firms to make 
securities selection decisions. Mutual fund management firms charge fees to their unit 
holders (or shareholders), based on the value of a fund’s assets and the analytical 
complexity of portfolio management, for administering a mutual funds and managing its 
investment portfolio (Khorana et al., 2009; Tufano, Sevick, 1997).  
Security valuation. Cashman and Deli (2009) found evidence suggesting that 
portfolio management requiring greater analytical intensity due to complex security 
valuation was positively correlated with the probability of de-integration between fund 
administration and portfolio management. Valuation of foreign equity, for example, is 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED VERTICAL DE-INTEGRATION 
 9 
considered more complex than the valuation of domestic equity. While domestic equity 
valuation requires an estimation of future cash flows and appropriate discount rates, foreign 
equity valuation also demands an understanding of differences in the cultural, business, 
legal, and tax environments and how these affect valuation (Cashman, Deli, 2009). With 
foreign equity funds, portfolio managers must consider the degree and direction of foreign 
exchange rates, political, legal, and socio-economic environments that are different from 
more familiar domestic ones, as well as different and perhaps less meticulous financial 
reporting frameworks that are often incommensurable with better known domestic 
regulatory systems. Even where these differences are minimal, changes in the value of a 
foreign currency over the investment holding-period is one variable involved in the 
valuation of foreign equity that is not a consideration with a domestic equity investment. 
Similarly, because equity may be considered a residual claim on assets and generally 
involves greater risk than debt, Cashman and Deli (2009) suggest that, on average, the 
valuation of equity is more complex than the valuation of debt. They allow however that 
this may not always be the case when, for example, comparing the equity of a large 
regulated firm with the debt of a small distressed firm (Cashman, Deli, 2009). 
Valuation of a financial security whose value is influenced by a greater number of 
interrelated variables will be more complex and therefore more analytically intense than 
valuation of a security with a few discrete estimation elements. The valuation of foreign 
equities may be considered more analytically intense than the valuation of domestic 
equities, because the former is performed with relatively more ambiguous data drawn from 
a more opaque socio-economic environment, while the latter relies on relatively 
unambiguous data drawn from a less obscure domestic market.  
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The valuation of fixed income securities is similarly less analytically intense than 
the valuation of domestic equities. With fixed income securities, such as bonds and 
debentures, the amount, timing and duration of cash flows are prearranged by agreement 
between borrower and lender. The greatest risk to mispricing stems from misjudging 
changes in the general level of interest rates (interest rate risk). Additional risks associated 
with pricing of fixed income securities are associated with expectations of inflation and the 
credit rating of the issuer. Analysts will not differ practically from each other in the 
valuation of fixed income securities, despite some differences in technique (Cottle et al., 
1988). 
In contrast, the analysis of contingent, intermittent and irregular cash flows accruing 
to equity securities is more complex. In addition to changing interest and inflation rates and 
issuer credit-worthiness, a portfolio manager must also consider how macro-economic 
factors such as the unemployment rates, consumer and producer sentiments, affect the 
contingent cash flows generated by equity securities generally, and how a firm’s 
management, competitive advantages, competitors, and markets affect the value of its 
equity in particular. These variables are rarely the focal point of those analyzing debt 
securities. 
Analytical intensity and reliance on tacit knowledge. Analytical intensity has been 
variously defined as comprehensiveness, procedural rationality, or extent of analysis 
(Kahlert, 2010; Miller, 2008). Comprehensiveness refers to the degree to which an 
extensive decision-making process, involving high levels of investigatory activity, is 
utilized to screen and evaluate alternatives (Miller, 2008). In complex decision-making 
conditions, comprehensiveness helps ensure consequential variables are investigated, 
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resulting in more accurate perceptions and better outcomes than if such comprehensiveness 
was absent (Dean, Sharfman, 1996; Miller, 2008). Similarly, Dean and Sharfman (1996, p. 
373) define procedural rationality as “the extent to which the decision process involves the 
collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this 
information in making the choice”. Finally, Miller (2008) describes extensive approaches to 
analysis as those that incorporate high levels of examination targeted at developing a 
diverse criteria for filtering alternatives and evaluating them. 
These descriptions of analytical intensity suggest that relative reliance on tacit 
knowledge will increase on increasing complexity of decision-making. Tacit knowledge 
may be defined as a value-endowing meta-resource originating from thought, reflection, or 
experience, and held by a knowing agent (Boisot, 1998; Choo, Bontis, 2002; Polanyi, 1969; 
Spender, 1996; van den Berg, 2013). This definition does not contradict the concept of 
dispersed knowledge, the idea that no single knowing agent is omniscient, but rather aims 
to put forward tacit knowledge as a factor of production. 
Tacit knowledge is employed in judging, interpreting, framing and solving problems 
(Balconi et al., 2007). It is used by individuals to evaluate information, to conceive of 
difficult to foresee outcomes, and to establish novel correlations among variables and give 
meaning to them (Balconi et al., 2007). Tacit knowledge includes “non-specific analytical 
skills for the recognition, formulation and solution of complex problems…” with “strong 
evaluative elements… based on experience” (Zellner, 2003, p. 1884). An individual’s 
heuristic and interpretive skills used in decoding and interpreting information are tacit in 
nature (Balconi, 2002). Successful performance with greater complexity of security 
valuation (“the imperfectly known interplay of many variables”) demands greater analytical 
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intensity and therefore suggests greater reliance on tacit knowledge (Balconi, 2002, p. 362). 
Conversely, given less complexity and analytical intensity in the valuation of 
domestic fixed income securities relative to valuation of foreign equity securities, success 
may be less reliant on tacit knowledge. Instead, valuation of less analytically intense 
securities may rely relatively more on the application of encapsulated knowledge. 
Encapsulated knowledge may be defined as a value-endowing meta-resource in the form of 
knowledge embedded in an artefact’s design and functionality (Boisot, 1998; Gorga, 2007; 
Langlois, 2001; van den Berg, 2013).  Thus, the less complex and analytically intense 
valuation of domestic fixed income securities may be relatively more reliant on knowledge 
embedded, for example, in the design and functionality of software platforms, than on the 
tacit knowledge resident only in the minds of portfolio managers. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Integration / De-Integration Profile 
Cashman and Deli (2009) found that U.S. mutual funds invested primarily in foreign 
equity had a greater probability of being de-integrated than those invested primarily in 
domestic equity, which in turn had a greater probability of being de-integrated than those 
invested primarily in fixed income securities. Tests were first conducted to determine 
whether the sample of Canadian mutual funds in this study shared a similar integration/de-
integration profile. 
Evidence from all sampled mutual funds identified as foreign equity or domestic 
equity, suggests that foreign equity mutual fund have a greater probability of being 
managed by de-integrated portfolio managers than domestic equity mutual funds (p < 
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0.001), corroborating Cashman and Deli (2009). Table 1 presents the results. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Similarly, evidence from sampled all mutual funds identified as domestic equity or 
fixed income, suggests that domestic equity mutual funds have a greater probability of 
being managed by de-integrated portfolio managers than fixed income mutual funds (p < 
0.001), again corroborating Cashman and Deli (2009). Table 2 presents the results. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Analytical Intensity and Divergent Knowledge Reliance 
Cashman and Deli (2009) argued that “security pricing is most difficult (analytically 
intensive)” with foreign equity funds and easiest with fixed income funds. They further 
argued that “when security valuation is complex, it is more difficult to effectively transfer 
the relevant knowledge required to understand a value recommendation” and that this 
accounts for the pattern of de-integration observed in the mutual fund industry (Cashman, 
Deli, 2009, p. 649). Since difficulty of effective transfer of knowledge is an increasing 
function of its tacitness (Szulanski, 1996; von Hippel, 1994; Zander, Kogut, 1995), we 
would expect to observe that differences in analytical intensity in the valuation of securities 
are positively related to reliance on tacit knowledge (and negatively related to reliance on 
encapsulated knowledge). The following hypotheses were tested were conducted on mutual 
funds broadly categorized as foreign equity, domestic equity, and fixed income to detect 
whether reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge is related to differences in analytical 
intensity of security valuation. 
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H1: Relative reliance on tacit knowledge by portfolio managers managing foreign 
equity mutual funds is greater than that for managing domestic equity mutual funds. 
H2: Relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge by portfolio managers managing 
foreign equity mutual funds is less than that for managing domestic equity mutual 
funds. 
Similarly, to detect whether evidence for a similar distinction between reliance on 
tacit and encapsulated knowledge is also present between domestic equity and fixed income 
mutual funds, the following hypotheses was tested. 
H3: Relative reliance on tacit knowledge by portfolio managers managing domestic 
equity mutual funds is greater than that for managing fixed income mutual funds. 
H4: Relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge by portfolio managers managing 
domestic equity mutual funds is less than that for managing fixed income mutual 
funds. 
Finally, to examine the impact of control variables, and as a robustness check, two 
logistic regressions were performed to test the following hypothesis. 
H5: The probability of de-integration of a mutual fund is related to the portfolio 
manager’s relative reliance on tacit, and encapsulated knowledge. 
The probability of de-integration of a mutual fund may be moderated by a number 
of variables. Mutual fund management firms may, for example, believe that their in-house 
portfolio management capability is limited in foreign securities, or limited in less traditional 
hedge funds or synthetic funds, and therefore contract for the necessary skills from external 
portfolio managers. 
DATA AND METHODS 
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Research Population 
The population for this research consists of Canadian mutual funds and their 
portfolio managers. Portfolio managers are also referred to as portfolio advisors, especially 
when they are employed by a sub-advisory firm not related to the mutual fund management 
firm. Mutual funds and their portfolio managers are an appropriate population for this 
research for a number of reasons. First, while in-house portfolio managers manage the 
majority of mutual funds, there is a significant and growing trend towards vertical de-
integration, known in the industry as making use of sub-advisory services (Costello, 1999; 
Duong, 2010; O'Brien, 2001). The extent of vertical de-integration is heterogeneous among 
the various mutual fund asset classes, with some, such as money market funds rarely being 
sub-advised, while about half of the assets in specialty health mutual funds are sub-advised 
in Canada and the US. The presence of both integrated and de-integrated mutual funds 
provides an opportunity to examine how the nature of knowledge may inform the decision 
to integrate, or de-integrate, the portfolio management function.1 
Second, the capital markets industry is relatively knowledge-based with relatively 
little physical capital involved in the various productive activities undertaken. This trend to 
dematerialization appears to be continuing as evidenced by various reports of the Canadian 
Capital Markets Association (CMA). The CMA has suggested that further 
dematerialization would reduce significant inefficiencies for the industry. Some mutual 
fund web sites indicate that paper-based certificates of ownership of a security are no 
                                                       
1 Determining the motivation for outsourcing the portfolio management function was beyond the scope of this 
paper. One CEO offered that his mutual management firm outsourced to fill out his firm’s offerings when a 
new variety of product suddenly appeared in demand and in-house capability did not yet exist. At least one 
other mutual fund management firm outsourced all of its portfolio management, claiming that its expertise lay 
not in portfolio management but in the selection of exceptionally well-performing portfolio managers. 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED VERTICAL DE-INTEGRATION 
 16 
longer being available but have been replaced by digital certificates. Consequently, the 
research results in the mutual fund industry are expected to be more robust than if a more 
material-based manufacturing industry were examined. 
Sample and Data 
Data were collected from two sources, one primary and one secondary. Primary data 
were collected from portfolio managers using an Internet based survey. The data were 
collected from mid-2006 into the first quarter of 2007. Collection of items designed to 
measure relative reliance on tacit, codified and encapsulated knowledge necessitated the 
use of survey, as no secondary source of such data is available. 
Measures of relative reliance by portfolio managers on tacit and encapsulated 
knowledge were calculated for 430 mutual funds. Of these funds, 311 fell into the broad 
categories of foreign equity, domestic equity, and fixed income. The remaining mutual 
funds that did not fit into one of these three broad categories consisted mainly of balanced 
and specialty funds. The 311 mutual funds were divided into 117 foreign equity funds, 120 
domestic equity funds, and 74 fixed income funds. 
Secondary Data. Secondary data were provided by Fundata Canada Inc., which 
agreed to provide its data at no cost for academic purposes. The secondary data consisted of 
individual mutual fund details, including particulars about mutual fund management firms 
and individual portfolio managers. The secondary data facilitated the detection of inter-firm 
boundaries between mutual fund management firms and portfolio management firms. 
Primary Data. Sampling within all firms was not random. A few of the firms 
agreeing to participate required the negotiation of a ‘representative’ list of potential 
respondents because the senior executives would only agree to the surveying of a limited 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED VERTICAL DE-INTEGRATION 
 17 
number of his or her portfolio managers. The criteria employed by these senior executives 
were not revealed. 
A total of 252 invitational emails were sent to portfolio managers in the 21 firms. 
The overall response rate was 60.7% (152). This excellent response rate is tempered by the 
reality that not all potential firm employees were available to be sampled and only 22% of 
the invited firms participated. Nevertheless, the response rate compares favorably with the 
overall response rate of 6.3% achieved in a recent survey of portfolio managers in the USA 
(Farnsworth, Taylor, 2006). 
Survey. The online survey consisted primarily of six questions (available from the 
author upon request) designed to capture relative reliance on tacit, codified, and 
encapsulated knowledge. Each question related the three classifications to one of the six 
perspectives: locus, transferability, expression, acquisition, source of value, and 
observability (van den Berg, 2011, 2013). The questions were designed to elicit relative 
measures of reliance on each form of knowledge in the production and management of a 
mutual fund portfolio. 
Portfolio managers were asked to rate the most important knowledge-based factor 
with a value of 10 and to rate the remaining two items relative to 10 (and to each other) for 
each of the six perspectives. The respondent ratings for reliance on the three classifications 
of knowledge were therefore relative measures. These were later transformed to sum to 
one, resulting in a total of 18 items measuring relative reliance on one of three 
classifications of knowledge across six perspectives. 
Before the ratio variables were standardized, they were reviewed for normality, 
which could have been impaired by skewness and/or kurtosis. After five transformations, 
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based on recommendations gleaned from ‘laddering’ (StataCorp, 2005), 18 items were 
standardized. Selected standardized items were then averaged to produce three scales or 
indexes measuring relative reliance on tacit, codified, and encapsulated knowledge. A 
number of validity tests were performed, including confirmatory factor analysis, and 
structural equation modeling. Both the scale reliability tests and the confirmatory factor 
analysis failed to produce a reliably measurable latent variable of reliance on codified 
knowledge (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.58). Accordingly, all subsequent tests and modeling were 
performed exclusive of relative reliance on codified knowledge. 
Variables and Measurement 
Dependent Variable: The Probability of Vertical De-integration. The research 
sought an explanation for the observation that the portfolio manager role was integrated 
within a mutual fund management firm in the majority of cases, but de-integrated 
(performed in a separate firm) in other cases. A mutual fund may be termed to be ‘sub-
advised’ when an individual from an organization outside the mutual fund management 
firm is contracted to act as portfolio manager. The term ‘sub-advised’ is used by the 
industry to describe such an arrangement rather than simply ‘advised’ because the fund 
management firm retains ultimate legal responsibility for managing the mutual fund, and is 
responsible for monitoring the portfolio manager on behalf of the mutual fund’s unit 
holders. When a mutual fund is sub-advised, the mutual fund management firm is legally 
required to notify investors through the fund’s prospectus. 
For the purposes of this research, however, not all mutual funds whose prospectuses 
report that they are sub-advised are considered de-integrated. For example, the prospectus 
of a mutual fund may indicate that CIBC is the mutual fund management firm, its 
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subsidiary CIBC Asset Management Inc. is the portfolio manager, and TAL Global Asset 
Management Inc. is the fund’s ‘sub-adviser’. For the purposes of this research, the mutual 
fund would not be considered to be de-integrated since TAL is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of CIBC. In other words, a mutual fund management firm and a portfolio management 
organization are only considered de-integrated when the individual that acts as portfolio 
manager is not an employee of the mutual fund management firm or any other firm known 
to be owner-affiliated with the management firm. This definition corresponds to that used 
by at least one other research organization studying sub-advisory services (Financial 
Research Corporation). 
Independent Variables. Only in a few exceptional situations will production not 
rely upon some combination of tacit, codified, and encapsulated knowledge. In the vast 
majority of cases, a mixture of all three knowledge-based factors will contribute to 
production. The independent variables of interest in this research are two knowledge-based 
factors of production defined as relative reliance on tacit knowledge and relative reliance 
on encapsulated knowledge. 
Control Variables. In addition to reliance on knowledge-based factors of 
production, the probability of de-integration of a mutual fund may be moderated by a 
number of variables. Mutual fund management firms may, for example, believe that their 
in-house portfolio management capability is limited in foreign securities, or limited in less 
traditional hedge funds or synthetic funds, and therefore contract for the necessary skills 
from external portfolio managers. 
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Control variables considered in this study included hedge-fund status, synthetic fund 
status, as well as variables for each of seven specific investment regions2 (Canada, USA, 
North America, Europe, Japan, International, and Global). Also used for control was a 
multinomial variable based on Cashman and Deli (2009), that was split into two binomial 
variables: Foreign Equity relative to Fixed Income, and Domestic Equity relative to Fixed 
Income. 
One control variable that was not included was fund family size. Cashman and Deli 
found that smaller mutual fund management firms were more likely to engage sub-advisory 
services to realize economies of scale. They also found that fund family size was not 
significant in explaining mutual fund performance. 
Analysis 
All mutual funds have portfolio managers. Some mutual funds have multiple 
portfolio managers (multi-managed) and some only have one (single-managed). Some 
portfolio managers are involved in the management of only one mutual fund and some are 
involved in the management of a number of mutual funds. Every combination of mutual 
fund to portfolio manager relationship exists (one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, and 
many-to-many). In other words, one mutual fund may have one portfolio manager or more 
than one portfolio manager, and a collection of mutual funds may be managed by a single 
portfolio manager, or by a group or team of portfolio managers. Each of these relationships 
may consist of portfolio managers whose firm is affiliated, or not, with the fund 
management firm. In the case of multi-managed funds, the fund management organization 
                                                       
2 The global investment region characterizes mutual funds whose portfolios may include securities from 
anywhere in the world, while the international investment region characterizes mutual funds whose portfolios 
are invested outside of Canada and the USA. 
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may be affiliated with all, none, or some of the portfolio managers’ firms. Since the 
research attempts to explain the presence or absence of discrete inter-firm boundaries, the 
cases involving multi-managed funds with mixed affiliation were excluded. 
Of the 147 portfolio managers who responded to the survey, 87 could be identified 
as individual portfolio managers in the secondary mutual fund data. The remaining 60 were 
likely included in the secondary data as part of a ‘team’ of portfolio managers. 
Unfortunately, there was no definitive method of learning the identities of the individuals 
constituting each team for the various periods under evaluation. The 87 individual portfolio 
managers were found in 619 relationships with mutual funds or about seven mutual funds 
for each portfolio manager. 
The distribution of relationships is skewed with a few portfolio managers being 
related to a large number of mutual funds. It appears that these portfolio managers manage 
many essentially identical funds. These ‘clone’ funds are simply ‘white label’ products re-
branded for sale by a variety of mutual fund management firms and/or distributors. It is 
also possible that some portfolio managers, if they have a good reputation, are assigned for 
marketing purposes to multi-managed mutual funds to lend credibility to otherwise 
unfamiliar teams. Being spread over an exceptionally large number of mutual funds 
probably limits their influence on the performance of each individual mutual fund. 
The measurements for relative reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge of the 
87 identifiable portfolio managers were added to the database of 5,811 mutual funds, as 
applicable. For the 171 single-managed relationships, the measurements of the knowledge-
based variables were entered on a one-to-one basis (i.e., the measurements from a single 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED VERTICAL DE-INTEGRATION 
 22 
portfolio manager were added to the one mutual fund for which that portfolio manager was 
identified). 
The 619 portfolio management relationships were with 430 individual mutual funds, 
319 of which had portfolio managers who were considered integrated and 111 of which 
were considered de-integrated. The larger percentage of integrated mutual funds was 
similar to the distribution of all 3,856 mutual funds for which both organizational structure 
and management mode were known. A chi-square test was conducted to analyze whether or 
not the relationship between organizational structure and management mode previously 
tested with the 3,856 mutual funds was also significant with the subset of 430 for which 
measures of relative reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge had been estimated. The 
results were significant (p < 0.01) indicating that the null hypothesis of independence may 
be ruled out, and that organizational structure and management mode variables are also 
significantly related for this subset. Table 3 presents the distribution. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Specification of the Model 
The dependent variable is the presence or absence of an inter-firm boundary 
between a mutual fund management firm and a portfolio manager, a binary variable 
indicating whether an upstream stage of production and an adjacent downstream stage of a 
value chain are integrated in one firm or de-integrated into two separate and unaffiliated 
firms. 
Some adjacent stages of production may be separated by a less than definitive inter-
firm boundary. For example, a downstream stage (a mutual fund distributor) may have an 
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investment interest in an upstream stage (a portfolio management firm) of greater than 0% 
but less than 100%, and vice versa. For the purposes of this research, stages of production 
will be considered de-integrated when they share no ownership in common. Any evidence 
of common ownership, even if only partial, will be considered as evidence of integration. In 
practice however, there is no public record of ownership below 10%, so the actual 
demarcation is at that level. 
RESULTS 
Analytical intensity of complex security valuation 
If greater analytical intensity may be manifested as greater reliance on tacit 
knowledge and lesser reliance on encapsulated knowledge (Balconi, 2002; Balconi et al., 
2007), then in accordance with Cashman and Deli (2009), portfolio managers managing 
foreign equity mutual funds are more reliant on tacit knowledge than portfolio managers 
managing domestic equity mutual funds. Testing of H1 provided support for the 
relationship (p < 0.001). Cohen’s ‘d’ was calculated to be 0.71 (Cohen, 1992) for the effect 
size of the difference between relative reliance on tacit knowledge for foreign equity 
mutual funds and domestic equity mutual funds. This may be interpreted as a medium-to-
large effect size (Cohen, 1988). The power of the test was calculated to be 98% (Faul et al., 
2007, 2007) when alpha was set at 0.001 (two-tailed). 
Testing of H2 also provided support for a relationship between relative reliance on 
encapsulated knowledge and the portfolio management of foreign equity mutual funds and 
domestic equity mutual funds. Evidence suggests portfolio managers managing foreign 
equity mutual funds are less reliant on encapsulated knowledge than those managing 
domestic equity mutual funds (p < 0.001). Table 4 presents the results. 
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------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
H3 and H4 were tested to detect whether or not similar evidence is also present 
between domestic equity and fixed income mutual funds. H3 and H4 were both supported. 
Evidence suggests portfolio managers managing domestic equity mutual funds are more 
reliant on tacit knowledge than portfolio managers managing fixed income mutual funds (p 
< 0.001). Evidence also suggests portfolio managers managing domestic equity mutual 
funds are less reliant on encapsulated knowledge than those managing fixed income mutual 
funds (p < 0.001). Table 5 presents the results. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
De-integration and knowledge-based factors of production 
The results of testing H1 through H4 suggest that the analytical intensity of security 
valuation put forth by Cashman and Deli (2009) as a cause of de-integration may be 
positively related to reliance on tacit knowledge and negatively related to reliance on 
encapsulated knowledge. These results taken together also appear to suggest that increasing 
analytic intensity of complex security valuation as revealed by increasing (decreasing) 
relative reliance on tacit (encapsulated) knowledge gives rise to an increasing probability of 
de-integration and the presence of an inter-firm boundary. Figure 1 depicts a graphical 
summary of these findings. 
The size and labels of the spheres represent the probability of de-integration. The 
scale of both axes is in units of standard deviation. 
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------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Two logistic regressions were used with organizational structure (probability of de-
integration) as the dependent variable to test H5. The first test consisted of a logistic 
regression incorporating moderating effects from hedge-fund status, synthetic fund status, 
and investment region. Dummy variables were used for each of seven investment regions3 
(Canada, USA, North America, Europe, Japan, International, and Global), hedge fund 
status, and synthetic fund status. The results of the first stage model suggest that whether a 
mutual fund is a hedge fund or a synthetic fund (p > 0.5), does not impact the probability 
that it will be de-integrated. There is evidence, however, that suggests three of the seven 
investment regions influence the probability of de-integration with some degree of 
significance. Model I in Table 6 displays the estimated coefficients for only those three 
investment regions. The specific investment regions that were eventually found to be 
significant were Canada (p = 0.013), Europe (p < 0.001), and Global (p = 0.006), but 
Canada only became significant once the knowledge-based variables were added in Model 
II. The coefficients for Europe and Global (foreign) are larger than the coefficient for 
Canada (domestic) supporting the findings of Cashman and Deli (2009). The positive 
coefficient estimates for each of the variables suggest that the probability of de-integration 
increases for mutual funds invested in any of these regions. 
In Model II, the variables for relative reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge 
were added to the variables used in Model I. The estimate for relative reliance on 
                                                       
3 The global investment region characterizes mutual funds whose portfolios may include securities from 
anywhere in the world, while the international investment region characterizes mutual funds whose portfolios 
are invested outside of Canada and the USA. 
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encapsulated knowledge was significant (p < 0.001). The co-efficient for the relative 
reliance on tacit knowledge, while surprisingly negative, was not significant (p > 0.10). The 
significant positive coefficients for investment regions of Europe, and Global may capture 
the effect of relative reliance on tacit knowledge. Model II in Table 6 displays the estimated 
coefficients for all significant variables plus relative reliance on tacit knowledge. The 
improvement in the -2 log likelihood from Model I to Model II was significant (p < 0.001) 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The second test of H5 was a logistic regression that directly tested whether relative 
reliance on tacit knowledge may be used as a measure of analytic intensity in security 
valuation as suggested by Cashman and Deli (2009). The test consisted of a logistic 
regression using a multinomial variable for the categories of Foreign Equity, Domestic 
Equity, and Fixed Income. 
The results in Model III support the findings of Cashman and Deli (2009) that 
Foreign Equity mutual funds are more likely de-integrated than Fixed Income funds. The 
variable of Foreign Equity to Fixed Income is significant in explaining the probability of 
de-integration, while that of Domestic Equity to Fixed income appears insignificant. 
Model IV expands on Model III by including the variable of relative reliance on 
tacit knowledge by portfolio managers. The model suggests that greater analytic intensity in 
security valuation is exhibited in this research as greater relative reliance on tacit 
knowledge. The addition of the significant tacit knowledge variable is the only difference 
between Model III and Model IV, and its introduction causes the Foreign Equity relative to 
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Fixed Income variable to loose its significance. The improvement in -2 log likelihood is 
significant (p < 0.01). The results are displayed in Table 7. 
Two alternatives to Model iV were also tested. One alternative added the variable of 
relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge, while the other alternative simply replaced the 
relative reliance on tacit knowledge with relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge. With 
both alternatives, the Foreign Equity relative to Fixed Income coefficient still became 
insignificant. 
------------------------------------------ 




Two conclusions may be drawn from this research. First, differences in relative 
reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge appear to explain differences between 
integrated and de-integrated stages of production. In-house portfolio managers appear to be 
relatively less (more) reliant on tacit (encapsulated) knowledge than external portfolio sub-
advisors. Second, the more analytically intense the management of a portfolio of 
investments as measured by increasing (decreasing) relative reliance on tacit (encapsulated) 
knowledge, the greater the probability of an inter-firm boundary between the portfolio 
manager and the mutual fund management firm. 
In the mutual fund industry, the evidence suggests greater outsourcing of more 
specialized categories of funds managed with greater relative reliance on tacit knowledge, 
and practically exclusive in-house management of ordinary money market funds relying 
relatively more on encapsulated knowledge. This may suggest that larger firms focused on 
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economies of scale and distribution (i.e., mutual fund management firms) may find it 
expedient to expand their product offering by outsourcing production that is relatively more 
reliant on tacit knowledge (i.e., contracting with sub-advisory portfolio managers). It may 
also suggest that as industries evolve over time and their value chains lengthen, it is more 
cost-effective to retain in-house those functions that tend to be more generic, systematized, 
and reliant on encapsulated knowledge while outsourcing those that tend to be more unique, 




This paper extends existing research on the knowledge-based view of the firm with 
three important contributions. First, it built upon refinements of a number of recent survey 
instruments for measuring organizational knowledge (Choi, Lee, 2003; Fey, Birkinshaw, 
2005; Leiponen, 2003; McEvily, Chakravarthy, 2002; Simonin, 1999; Subramaniam, 
Venkatraman, 2001). The measurement of different classifications of knowledge was 
accomplished through the collection of relative reliance on these classifications from six 
different perspectives (van den Berg, 2011, 2013). 
Secondly, the analysis of survey results suggested that differences in the knowledge 
relied upon in production may effectively be measured between adjacent stages of 
production. The measurement of relative reliance on tacit knowledge and especially 
encapsulated knowledge proved very reliable, while the measurement of relative reliance 
on codified knowledge exhibited insufficient reliability. 
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The third, and perhaps most valuable, contribution of this paper is that it presents 
evidence that relates reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge to the presence or 
absence of an inter-firm boundary. A stage of production with a relatively high (low) 
reliance on tacit (encapsulated) knowledge was found to be more likely de-integrated from 
an adjacent stage than if such a stage was less (more) reliant on tacit (encapsulated) 
knowledge. Arguably, these findings add definition to the analytic intensity of security 
valuation that, according to Cashman and Deli (2009), serves as the basis for variation in 
degree of vertical integration of mutual funds. 
Limitations 
There is an implied assumption that a portfolio manager’s relative reliance on tacit 
and encapsulated knowledge does not vary between the funds she or he manages. This 
assumption is questionable, especially in the case of a portfolio manager responsible for 
funds requiring the application of more than one investment policy. Evidence not presented 
here suggests that relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge is related to the portfolio 
management strategy being applied, and a cursory review of the mutual funds suggests that 
a number of portfolio managers managed funds with different strategies. 
For the multi-managed mutual funds, the knowledge-based measures of the 
portfolio managers identified with the mutual fund were averaged and then entered. Some 
multi-managed funds had only one respondent portfolio manager, many had two, and one 
had five. This process introduced two potential inaccuracies. First, in the cases where less 
than all of a mutual fund’s portfolio managers are surveyed, the knowledge-based 
measurements of the non-respondent portfolio managers are excluded from consideration. 
The implied assumption is that non-respondent portfolio managers’ average relative 
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reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge is equal to the average of those who 
responded. 
Secondly, simply averaging the knowledge-based measures of the portfolio 
managers assumes that they are all equally influential in the management of a multi-
managed mutual fund. This assumption implies that disproportionate influence does not 
exist between a team of portfolio managers of a multi-managed fund. The implied 
assumption limits the accuracy of the knowledge-based measures, unless the assets of a 
fund are purposefully proportionately managed. 
The measurements of relative reliance on tacit, codified, and encapsulated 
knowledge were not based on direct observations, but were self-reported. Measurement 
error entered this research because a different individual reported each participant’s 
responses. It would be preferable in future research if measurements could be made more 
consistent by collecting them directly using a single external observer. 
Since all these limitations conspired against the results obtained, the findings 
presented in this paper are all the more surprising. 
Future Research 
The findings presented here suggest that subsequent research be undertaken to relate 
organizational structures arranged according to knowledge-based factors to organizational 
performance. This research should seek to determine if organizational structures that most 
strongly fit the model offered in this paper differ in performance from those that most 
strongly refute the model. This would lend strength to the position that organizing along 
knowledge-based factors is something managers should be considering when making 
boundary decisions. 
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Since this research focused on discrete inter-firm boundaries, it was beyond the 
scope of this research to assess multi-managed funds with mixed affiliation (multiple 
portfolio managers, some in-house, some external to the mutual fund management firm).  
Future research could explore these hybrid governance modes of portfolio management, 
perhaps building on the organizational structure coding used by Csaszar (2012). 
Future research may also test the generalizability of this study in related industries 
represented by the NAICS code 5239 - Other Financial Investment Activities, since these 
share many of the attributes of the population sampled for this research. With some 
exceptions4, this industry group includes establishments primarily engaged in, or acting as 
agents in, the purchase and sale of financial contracts, or providing investment services 
such as portfolio management, investment advice, and trust, fiduciary, and custody 
services. 
Research may also extend into industry groups that may not quickly come to mind 
when discussing “knowledge-based” industries. Industries heavily reliant on material 
resources in their production processes could be surprisingly amenable to study, since 
knowledge may be considered a necessary dimension of every production process (Lewin, 
Phelan, 2000). Furthermore, use such industry groups could provide fertile areas for testing 
the interplay of knowledge production and governance costs, given that contracting 
between external portfolio managers (sub-advisors) and mutual fund management firms 
leaves little room for opportunism (i.e., entails low governance costs). 
                                                       
4 Exceptions include investment bankers, securities dealers, commodity contracts dealers, securities 
brokerages, commodity contracts brokerages, securities exchanges, and commodity exchanges. 
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Another avenue of research worth pursuing involves the observation that risk and 
returns to de-integrated mutual funds are generally higher than those for integrated mutual 
funds. It may be that reliance on codified and/or encapsulated knowledge reduces both 
returns and risk, while reliance on tacit knowledge increases both. If that is the case, it 
could have implications for many types of production processes outside of the mutual fund 
industry. 
Managerial Implications 
The theory and evidence presented in this research suggest that managers may be 
setting inter-firm boundaries based, unintentionally, on differences in knowledge-based 
factor intensities between adjacent stages of production. Managers may be finding it 
difficult or cost-prohibitive to integrate, within a single firm, a stage of production that is 
predominantly reliant on tacit knowledge (knowledge that remains resident in the human 
mind). This may lead them to more likely outsource such production, creating an inter-firm 
boundary, than if such a stage of production were relatively more reliant on encapsulated 
knowledge (for example, knowledge embedded in the functionality and design of a 
software platform).  
The survey methodology used in this research may provide a starting point for the 
collection of data regarding knowledge-based factors of production. While measuring 
absolute values of knowledge-based factors may be elusive (Down, 2000), relative 
measurements may provide an adequate alternative. Managers may find that an awareness 
of the relative magnitudes of knowledge-based factors used in production processes can be 
a supplemental instrument for determining when to vertically integrate or de-integrate 
adjacent stages along a value chain. This study makes no claim to comprehensiveness in 
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weighing all factors to be considered in making decisions regarding vertical integration, but 
it offers a perspective that may prove to be valuable to managers charged with the 
responsibility of making these decisions. 
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TABLE 1 
Difference in probability of de-integration between foreign equity and domestic equity 
mutual funds 
 Foreign equity mutual funds 
Domestic equity 
mutual funds    








0.52 0.500 1138 0.39 .488 842 5.721*** 0.26 (small to medium) 99% 
 * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 




Difference in probability of de-integration between domestic equity and fixed income 
mutual funds 
 Domestic equity mutual funds 
Fixed income 
mutual funds    













 * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 
 *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 3 
Structure and management mode of mutual funds for which estimates of portfolio 
managers’ relative reliance on knowledge-based factors of production are available 
 Single-managed (One) Multi-managed (> One) Total 
Integrated  140 (32.6%) 179 (41.6%) 319 (74.2%) 
De-integrated  31 (7.2%) 80 (18.6%) 111 (25.8%) 
Total  171 (39.8%) 259 (60.2%) 430 
Chi square = 8.756 
df = 1 




Difference in relative reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge between foreign 
equity and domestic equity mutual funds 
 Foreign equity mutual funds 
Domestic equity 
mutual funds    




















 * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 
 *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 5 
Difference in relative reliance on tacit and encapsulated knowledge between domestic 
equity and fixed income mutual funds 
 Domestic equity mutual funds 
Fixed income mutual 
funds    


















 * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 




Logistic regression estimates for a de-integrated organizational structure using 
investment regionsa,b,c 
Independent variables Model I Model II 
Constant −1.535*** (0.295) 
−2.338*** 
(0.358) 
Investment region is Canada 0.280 (0.332) 
0.918* 
(0.371) 
Investment region is Europe 3.240*** (0.823) 
3.615*** 
(0.823) 
Investment region is Global 0.892* (0.369) 
1.146** 
(0.369) 
Relative reliance on tacit knowledge  -0.388 (0.244) 
Relative reliance on encapsulated knowledge  -1.260*** (0.246) 
N 430 430 
-2 Log likelihood 463.336 (3)*** 418.983 (5)*** 
Improvement in -2 Log likelihoodc 27.812 (3)*** 44.353 (2)*** 
 
a Positive coefficients indicate a greater probability of de-integration. Standard errors are in brackets. 
b  * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 
 *** p < 0.001 
c -2 Log likelihood for the null model was 491.148. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. 
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TABLE 7 
Logistic regression estimates for a de-integrated organizational structure using 
Cashman and Deli’s (2009) categories of analytic intensitya,b,c 
Independent variables Model III Model IV 
Constant −1.455*** (0.297) 
−1.238*** 
(0.303) 
Foreign Equity relative to Fixed Income 1.064** (0.353) 
0.533 
(0.399) 
Domestic Equity relative to Fixed Income −0.279 (0.392) 
−0.487 
(0.402) 
Relative reliance on tacit knowledge  0.577** (0.179) 
N 308 308 
-2 Log likelihood 327.002 (2)*** 316.625 (3)*** 
Improvement in -2 Log likelihoodc 21.576 (2)*** 10.377 (1)** 
a Positive coefficients indicate a greater probability of de-integration. Standard errors are in brackets. 
b  * p < 0.05 
 ** p < 0.01 
 *** p < 0.001 
c -2 Log likelihood for the null model was 348.578. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. 
